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Abstract 
 
Retailers’ private standards are increasingly important in addressing consumer concerns 
about safety, quality and social and environmental issues. Empirical evidence shows that 
these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts. I 
develop a political economy model that may contribute to explaining this stylized fact. I 
show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to 
impose a lower public standard, retailers may apply their market power to install a private 
standard at a higher level than the public one, depending on several factors. 
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When are Private Standards more Stringent than Public Standards? 
 
Thijs Vandemoortele 
1 Introduction 
Private standards, introduced by private companies, are increasingly important in the 
global market system (Henson and Hooker 2001; Henson 2004; Fulponi 2007). Retailers 
and producers have the possibility to introduce private standards in the same domains as 
in which the government imposes public standards, such as safety, quality, and social and 
environmental aspects of production, retail, and consumption.  
Retailers and companies have a variety of motives to implement private standards. 
First, private standards may reduce consumers’ uncertainty and information asymmetry 
about product characteristics such as safety, quality, and social and environmental 
aspects, thus increasing consumer demand. For example, Kirchhoff (2000) shows that 
firms may voluntarily reduce pollution to attract ‘green’ consumers if firms are able to 
signal their pollution abatement, for example through a private standard. Similarly, in a 
business to business environment, private standards allow to ensure and communicate 
product attributes about production, quality etc. which may facilitate firms to gear their 
activities to one another.  
Second, firms may use private standards as strategic tools to differentiate their 
products, thus creating market segmentation and softening competition. A basic result 
from the vertical differentiation literature is that firms are able to reduce price 
competition and raise their profits by differentiating the (vertical) quality attribute of their 
products (see e.g. Spence 1976; Mussa and Rosen 1978; Tirole 1988). Such quality 
differences can be signaled by setting a private standard. Several other authors have 
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shown that in a vertically differentiated market a minimum quality standard imposed by 
the government (a public standard) may raise welfare, depending on the type of 
competition between producers (see e.g. Leland 1979; Ronnen 1991; Boom 1995; 
Crampes and Hollander 1995; Valletti 1995; Winfree and McCluskey 2005). If the 
minimum quality standard is not prohibitively high such that it does not exceed the 
highest quality voluntarily supplied by producers, firms differentiate their quality levels: 
some produce at the minimum quality level while others produce at a higher quality level. 
The latter firms can signal their higher quality by setting a private standard that is more 
stringent than the public minimum quality standard (see e.g. Arora and Gangopadhyay 
1995). 
Third, private standards may also serve to preempt government regulations. For 
example, Lutz et al. (2000) show – in a vertical differentiation model with minimum 
quality standards – that high-quality firms may have an incentive to commit to a quality 
level before public standards are set, in order to induce the regulator to weaken public 
standards. They demonstrate that this results in welfare losses.1 In the same line of 
reasoning, McCluskey and Winfree (2009) argue that an important advantage of private 
over public standards is that the former are more flexible in response to changes in 
consumer tastes and preferences, and to changes in technology. Therefore, by preempting 
public standards through setting their own private standards, firms may minimize the 
negative effect of standards on revenues. From a political economy perspective, Maxwell 
et al. (2000) argue that firms may strategically preempt costly political action through 
                                                 
1 Lutz et al. (2000) assume that firms are the first movers in the standard-setting process by committing to a 
fixed quality level, whereas other papers on minimum quality standards (such as Leland 1979; Ronnen 
1991; Valletti 2000; Boom 1995) typically assume the government to be the first mover in setting 
minimum quality standards. 
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voluntary private standards. They argue that a private standard raises consumers’ welfare 
in the event that no public standard is imposed, which reduces consumers’ incentives to 
lobby for a public standard in case political entry is costly for consumers. The authors 
show that this preempting private standard is more stringent than the public standard 
which would have been imposed in absence of the private standard.  
Fourth, some authors have argued that instead of introducing private standards, 
firms may favor the imposition of a public standard that applies to all firms. Salop and 
Scheffman (1983) develop a model to show that a firm may demand stricter public 
standards if compliance is relatively more costly for its rivals. Similarly, Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele (2008; 2009; 2011) show that domestic firms may lobby in favor of a 
public standard if the standard’s marginal impact on production costs is larger for foreign 
than domestic firms. They show that if the political power of domestic firms is 
sufficiently large, standards may serve as protectionist instruments, either by over- or 
under-standardization. Maloney and McCormick (1982) argue that firms may benefit 
from public standards if the regulation increases marginal costs more than average costs. 
Their result holds either when entry is restricted, or when entry is free and the price effect 
exceeds the cost effect only for a subset of firms. 
Empirical evidence shows that 80% to 90% of retailers assess their own private 
standards slightly or significantly higher than public standards (see Figure 1). So far, to 
the best of our knowledge, only two models may offer an explanation for this 
observation, i.e. why retailers set their private standards at higher levels than what is 
required by law – and both explanations have weaknesses. First, the explanation offered 
by the vertical differentiation literature is that those retailers who set their private 
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standard at a higher level than the public minimum quality standard aim at differentiating 
themselves from other retailers that sell at the minimum quality standard, thus raising 
profits by reducing competition. However, this does not explain the phenomenon that 
organizations such as the BRC (British Retail Consortium) or the GLOBALG.A.P. 
(Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice) introduce private standards that are 
more stringent than public standards, and that these relatively stringent private standards 
are adopted by almost all retailers in European countries. Another important example is 
the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), a standard-setting organization where leading 
retailers collaborate in developing collective private standards for food safety and/or 
sustainability (Fulponi 2007). 
Second, the political economy model of Maxwell et al. (2000) offers another 
potential explanation for the relative stringency of private standards vis-à-vis public 
standards: private standards may preempt public standards if consumers’ costs of getting 
politically organized are sufficiently high. This model explains why private standards are 
imposed in some domains where public standards are lacking. However, the model does 
not explain why private standards may be higher in areas where public standards already 
exist.2 
 The aim of this paper is to provide an additional explanation for the observation 
that private standards may be set at higher levels than their public counterparts – even 
when implementation costs do not differ between public and private standards. In our 
analysis, we assume that both public and private standards positively affect consumer 
utility by reducing information asymmetries, and that they both involve implementation 
                                                 
2 In the explanation of McCluskey and Winfree (2009), public standards are imposed (even though 
preempted by private standards) but at equal or higher levels than private standards. 
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costs for producers. Consumer utility and production costs are not affected differently by 
public and private standards, ceteris paribus, so differences in the level of public and 
private standards are not attributable to intrinsic differences between public and private 
standards. This is different from McCluskey and Winfree (2009) who assume that private 
standards are less costly to implement and may therefore be used to preempt public 
standards.  
A key innovation of our model is that we explicitly account for the role of a third 
(private) party in private standard-setting. So far the literature has only considered two-
agent models with ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’. However in reality there are often more 
agents than ‘final consumers’ and ‘primary producers’, and the same model has been 
used to interpret various stages of the chain. Hence, traders, processors, or retailers could 
be either ‘producers’ or ‘consumers’ depending on the specific case being considered. 
In our model we explicitly account for the role of a third private agent and we 
show that this may have important effects on private standard-setting. More specifically, 
we model a three-agent chain with producers, retailers, and consumers, where retailers 
transfer goods from producers to consumers. In reality many private standards are set by 
retailers or retailer groups – not by producers. Moreover, as our analysis will show, 
retailers’ interests in setting private standards do not necessarily coincide with producers’ 
interests. Retailers’ optimal private standards may be suboptimal from the producers’ 
perspective. Therefore we explicitly introduce a monopolist retailer that may set a private 
standard to regulate the same product characteristics as the government’s public standard. 
The assumption that the retailer is a monopolist is a convenient approach to impose 
retailers’ market power without introducing additional complexity to the model. We 
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discuss later how this assumption – and thus retailers’ market power – affects our 
results.3  
The public standard is assumed to be determined in a political game where 
producers and the retailer have political power to influence the government’s standard-
setting process. We model this political economy game along the lines of the model in 
Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011) which is based on the seminal model of Grossman 
and Helpman (1994). We assume there are no fixed costs of entering the political game. 
This assumption is different from Maxwell et al. (2000) who argue that private standards 
may preempt public regulation because the former reduce consumers’ incentives to lobby 
for public standards in case political entry is costly. 
Our analysis yields several findings. Most importantly, our analysis offers an 
explanation for the relative stringency of private standards vis-à-vis public standards. We 
show that a retailer may set its private standard at a higher level than the government’s 
optimal public standard if the retailer is able to shift the burden of the private standard’s 
implementation cost to producers. This outcome depends on the retailer’s market power 
and producers’ political influence. We show that also other factors such as the standard’s 
efficiency gain, implementation cost, and rent transfer from the retailer to producers 
affect the relative stringency of private versus public standards. Additionally, we show 
that side payments from producers to the retailer may influence the outcome, i.e. the 
levels of private and public standards. 
                                                 
3 We denote the third party as the ‘retailer’, but this market player may be any intermediate between 
producers and consumers, e.g. a processing firm. For our analysis, the third party’s relevant characteristics 
are that it acts as an intermediate between producers and consumers, and that it has some market power in 
exercising its function.  
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 specifies the different market agents 
in our model, i.e. consumers, producers, and the monopolist retailer, and determines the 
market equilibrium for a given standard. Section 3 analyzes how a standard affects the 
different market players. In Section 4 we first determine the retailer’s optimal private 
standard, and second we model the government’s decision-making process on public 
standards which determines the government’s optimal public standard. We then compare 
the levels of the retailer’s optimal private standard and the government’s optimal public 
standard to show under which conditions the private standard is set at a higher level than 
the public one, and which factors influence these conditions. Additionally, Section 4 
analyzes to what extent retailers’ market power is important to our results. Section 5 
applies the model to the case of private standards that regulate developing countries’ 
high-value export sectors. Finally, Section 6 extends the model by allowing for side 
payments by producers to influence the retailer’s private standard-setting behavior, and 
analyzes how this affects our results. The last section concludes the paper. 
2 The Model 
We first specify the different market players and the market equilibrium for a given 
standard, public or private. We assume that consumers are ex ante uncertain about the 
characteristics of the product (see also Leland 1979). Standards may thus improve upon 
the unregulated market equilibrium by guaranteeing the presence or absence of 
respectively positive or negative experience or credence characteristics (Nelson 1970; 
Darby and Karni 1973) and by reducing asymmetric information between consumers and 
producers. Similar to most studies, we assume that the introduction of a standard involves 
implementation costs for producers (see e.g. Leland 1979; Ronnen 1991; Valletti 2000). 
 - 9 - 
We assume that private and public standards are intrinsically the same, i.e. that their 
impacts on consumer utility and production costs are not different, ceteris paribus, such 
that differences in levels of public and private standards are not attributable to intrinsic 
differences between public and private standards. A novel feature of our model is the 
inclusion of an intermediary agent – a retailer – that transfers products from producers to 
consumers. We limit our analysis to a closed-economy model to refrain from potential 
standards-as-barriers-to-trade issues. 
2.1. Consumers 
Consider a standard which guarantees certain quality/safety features of the product. Such 
a standard positively affects utility as it reduces or solves information asymmetries. 
Therefore a standard induces to consume more of the product through an increased 
willingness to pay, ceteris paribus. For example consumers who perceive health problems 
with certain (potential) ingredients or production processes may increase consumption if 
they are guaranteed the absence of these elements. To model this, we assume a 
representative consumer utility function ( ),u x s  where x  is consumption of the good, 
and s  is the (public or private) standard. A higher s  refers to a more stringent standard. 
Consumer utility is increasing and concave both in consumption ( )0; 0x xxu u> <  and the 
standard ( )0; 0s ssu u> < .4 We further assume that 0xsu > , i.e. that a standard has a larger 
marginal impact on consumer utility if consumption is larger. The representative 
consumer maximizes consumer surplus CΠ  by choosing consumption x :  
                                                 
4 In the remainder of the paper, subscripts denote partial derivatives to x  or s , and superscripts refer to 
consumers ( )C , producers ( )P , the retailer ( )R , social welfare ( )W , or the government ( )G . 
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 ( )max ,C
x
u x s px⎡ ⎤Π = −⎣ ⎦ , (1) 
where p  is the consumer price. The first order condition of this maximization problem is  
 0
C
xu px
∂Π = − =∂ . (2) 
Rewriting Equation (2) gives 
 ( ),xp u x s= , (3) 
which implicitly defines the inverse demand function ( ),p x s . The inverse demand 
function is downward sloping with 0x xxp u= < . For simplicity, xxsu  is assumed to be 
zero, i.e. the slope of the inverse demand function is not affected by the standard. Since 
0s xsp u= > , a higher standard shifts the inverse demand function upwards. The reduced-
form expression for consumer surplus is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,C x s u x s p x s xΠ = − . (4) 
2.2. Producers 
We assume that production is a function of a sector-specific input factor that is available 
in inelastic supply. All profits made in the sector accrue to the specific factor owners, i.e. 
the producers. We assume that a standard imposes some production constraints or 
obligations which increase production costs. The idea behind this assumption is that all 
standards can be defined as the prohibition to use a cheaper technology. Examples are the 
prohibition of an existing technology (e.g. child labor) or of a technology that has not yet 
been used but that could potentially lower costs (e.g. GM technology). Also traceability 
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standards can be interpreted as a prohibition of cheaper production systems which do not 
allow tracing the production.  
To model this, consider a representative producer with cost function ( ),c x s  that 
depends on output and the standard.5 The cost function is assumed to be increasing and 
convex both in production ( )0; 0x xxc c> >  and the standard ( )0; 0s ssc c> > . We further 
assume that 0xsc > , i.e. that a standard has a larger marginal impact on production costs 
for a larger output. Producers are price takers, maximizing their profits PΠ  by setting 
output x :  
 ( )max ,P
x
wx c x s⎡ ⎤Π = −⎣ ⎦ , (5) 
where w  is the producer price. The first order condition of this maximization problem is  
 0
P
xw cx
∂Π = − =∂ . (6) 
Rewriting Equation (6) gives 
 ( ),xw c x s= , (7) 
which implicitly defines the inverse supply function ( ),w x s . The inverse supply function 
is upward sloping with 0x xxw c= > . For simplicity, xxsc  is assumed to be zero so that the 
slope of the inverse supply function is not affected by the standard. Since 0s xsw c= > , a 
higher standard shifts the inverse supply function upwards. The reduced-form expression 
for producer profits is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,P x s w x s x c x sΠ = − . (8) 
                                                 
5 Since in equilibrium consumption equals output, we use the same symbol x  for both output and 
consumption. 
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In the remainder of the analysis we assume that production costs are sufficiently convex 
and consumer utility sufficiently concave in s  to ensure global maxima. 
2.3. The Retailer 
We assume that output is sold by producers to consumers through one intermediary agent 
– a monopolist retailer. This assumption is a convenient approach to model retailer 
market power without introducing additional complexity to the model. We discuss later 
how this assumption – and thus retailers’ market power – affects our results. We will 
show that retailers’ market power is one part of the explanation why some industry-wide 
private standards are more stringent than public standards. 
The retailer’s handling costs are normalized to zero. The monopolist retailer is a 
Stackelberg leader who sets consumer and producer prices such that, under optimal price-
taking behavior of consumers and producers, consumption and output equal at a level that 
maximizes the retailer’s profits, RΠ . This is formally equivalent to maximizing the 
retailer’s profits with respect to quantity, x , using the inverse supply and demand 
functions (7) and (3) which represent the optimal price-taking behavior of consumers and 
producers and thus define producer and consumer prices for a given quantity. Formally, 
the retailer’s profits are 
 ( ) ( )( )max , ,R
x
p x s w x s x⎡ ⎤Π = −⎣ ⎦ , (9) 
where p w−  is the retailer’s margin.  
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2.4. The Market Equilibrium 
The first order condition of the retailer’s profit maximization is 
 ( ) 0R x xp w x p wx
∂Π = − + − =∂ , (10) 
and hence the equilibrium quantity ( )*x s , for a given level of the standard s , is 
 ( )* x x
xx xx
u cx s
c u
−= − . (11) 
Equation (11) is not a closed-form solution since both xu  and xc  depend on x . The 
denominator is always positive because the cost function is convex and the utility 
function concave in x . The numerator is positive if x xu c> , or according to Equations (3) 
and (7), if p w> . This condition – which we assume to hold throughout the paper – 
assures a positive retailer margin and profits. The reduced-form expressions for consumer 
surplus, producer profits, and retailer profits at market equilibrium are respectively 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )* * *, ,C s u x s s p x s s x sΠ = − ; (12) 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* * *, ,P s w x s s x s c x s sΠ = − ; (13) 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )* * *, ,R s p x s s w x s s x s⎡ ⎤Π = −⎣ ⎦ . (14) 
3 The Impact of a Standard 
Before determining the optimal public and private standards and how they compare, it is 
instructive to analyze the effect of a marginal change in the standard (whether public or 
private) on the market equilibrium, the interests of the different market players, and 
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social welfare. The impact of a marginal change in the standard on the equilibrium 
quantity, ( )*x s , is 
 * 1
2
xs xs
s
xx xx
u cx
c u
−= − . (15) 
Equation (15) shows that the standard’s marginal impact on the equilibrium quantity may 
be positive or negative. The equilibrium quantity increases with a more stringent standard 
if the upward shift in the inverse demand function, xsu , is larger than the upward shift in 
the inverse supply function, xsc ; and vice versa.
6 In other words, a higher standard 
induces the retailer to transfer a larger quantity ( )* 0sx >  if the standard’s impact on the 
retailer’s margin is positive ( )0s s xs xsp w u c− = − > . As Equations (10) and (11) show, a 
higher retailer margin allows the retailer to maximize its profits by setting a larger 
equilibrium quantity *x . 
 Next, we derive the standard’s marginal impact on the different market players’ 
interests using the envelope theorem. The marginal change in consumer surplus, ( )C sΠ , 
is 
 ( ) ( )( )* *C s xs xx ss u x s u u xs∂Π = − +∂ . (16) 
It consists of the efficiency gain, su , i.e. the positive marginal utility impact because of 
reduced information asymmetries, minus the marginal change in consumption 
expenditures, ( )( )* *xs xx sx s u u x+ . The marginal change in consumption expenditures per 
unit purchased is a consequence of both the higher willingness to pay for a product with a 
                                                 
6 Since production costs are convex and consumer utility is concave in x , the denominator of Equation 
(15) is always positive. 
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higher standard ( )0xsu >  and the change in willingness to pay because of a marginal 
change in consumption *sx . The size of the latter change in willingness to pay is 
determined by the slope of the inverse demand function, xxu . Because the marginal 
change in consumption may be either positive or negative, consumption expenditures 
may increase or decrease with the standard. Hence the standard’s marginal impact on 
consumer surplus is ambiguous. If the efficiency gain is larger than the marginal change 
in consumption expenditures, consumer surplus increases with the standard; and vice 
versa. 
 The marginal change in producer profits, ( )P sΠ , is 
 
( ) ( )( )* *P xs xx s ss x s c c x cs∂Π = + −∂ , (17) 
where the first term, ( )( )* *xs xx sx s c c x+ , is the marginal change in producer revenues and 
the second term, sc , is the implementation cost, i.e. the marginal cost increase due to the 
prohibition of using a cheaper technology. The marginal change in producer revenues per 
unit sold is a consequence of the higher marginal production costs due to a higher 
standard ( )0xsc >  and the change in marginal production costs because of a marginal 
change in output *sx . The size of the latter change in marginal production costs is 
determined by the slope of the inverse supply function, xxc . Because the marginal change 
in output may be positive or negative, producer revenues may increase or decrease with 
the standard. Hence, the marginal impact of a standard on producer profits is also 
ambiguous. When the implementation cost is smaller than the marginal change in 
producer revenues, producer profits increase with the standard; and vice versa. 
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The marginal change in the retailer’s profits, ( )R sΠ , is 
 
( ) ( )( )*R xs xss x s u cs
∂Π = −∂ . (18) 
The factor xs xsu c−  is the marginal change in the retailer’s margin and may be positive or 
negative, depending on the relative shifts of the inverse demand and supply functions. 
Hence the standard’s marginal impact on the retailer’s profits may be positive or 
negative. More specifically, the term ( )* xsx s u  represents the marginal increase in the 
retailer’s revenues because of the upward shift of the inverse demand function. The 
intuition is that, as consumers’ willingness to pay is higher for a product with a more 
stringent standard, a higher standard allows the retailer to set a higher consumer price for 
a given level of consumption *x . The higher consumer price results in higher revenues 
for the retailer but also in higher consumption expenditures for consumers (see Equation 
(16)). We therefore define ( )* xsx s u  as the rent transfer from consumers to the retailer 
due to a higher standard. Similarly, the term ( )* xsx s c  is the marginal increase in the 
retailer’s expenditures due to the upward shift in the inverse supply function. With a 
higher standard, the retailer pays a higher producer price for a given level of output *x  to 
compensate producers for their higher marginal production costs. The higher producer 
price results in higher expenditures for the retailer and in higher producer revenues (see 
Equation (17)). Hence, we define ( )* xsx s c  as the rent transfer from the retailer to 
producers because of a stricter standard. Equation (18) thus shows that the retailer’s 
profits increase with a higher standard if the rent transfer from consumers is larger than 
the rent transfer to producers; and vice versa. 
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The second factor in Equation (18) is the same as the numerator of Equation (15) 
which implies that *sx  has the same sign as 
( )R s
s
∂Π
∂ . This is in line with the discussion 
following Equation (15): an increase in the standard induces the retailer to transfer a 
larger quantity if the higher standard results in a higher retailer margin, or equivalently if 
the rent transfer from consumers is larger than the rent transfer to producers. Hence the 
equilibrium quantity only increases (decreases) if the retailer’s margin and profits 
increase (decrease) in the standard. 
 We can now also analyze the standard’s marginal impact on social welfare, 
( )W s , which is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, producer profits, and retailer 
profits: 
 ( ) ( )j
j
W s s= Π∑ , with , ,j C P R= . (19) 
The marginal change in social welfare is 
 ( ) ( ) ( )* *s s s xx xxW s u c x s x c us
∂ = − + −∂ , (20) 
and equals the direct welfare effects, i.e. the efficiency gain su  minus the implementation 
cost sc , plus an additional welfare gain (loss) if the equilibrium quantity increases 
(decreases). Therefore social welfare may increase or decrease with a higher standard, 
depending on the relative size of these factors. It is instructive to rewrite the third term in 
Equation (20): 
 ( ) ( ) ( )*
2s s xs xs
W s x s
u c u c
s
∂ = − + −∂ . (21) 
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This shows that the third term is only positive if the standard’s marginal impact on the 
retailer’s profits is positive (see Equation (18)), i.e. if the rent transfer from consumers is 
larger than the rent transfer to producers. 
In summary, it follows that all market players may gain or lose from a change in 
the standard, and that this change involves rent transfers between the different market 
players. Likewise, social welfare may either increase or decrease with a change in the 
standard, depending on the relative size of the efficiency gain, the implementation cost, 
and the different rent transfers. 
4 Optimal Public and Private Standards 
We analyze the optimal standard-setting behavior of both the retailer and the government. 
In line with the literature on minimum quality standards, we assume that the government 
moves first in setting its public standard (see e.g. Leland 1979; Ronnen 1991; Boom 
1995; Valletti 2000). We solve the game by backward induction and therefore determine 
first the retailer’s optimal private standard for a given level of the public standard. 
Second, we determine the government’s optimal public standard and third, we compare 
the level of the retailer’s optimal private standard, Rs , to the level of the government’s 
optimal public standard, Gs . Finally, we analyze to what extent retailers’ market power is 
important to our results. 
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4.1. The Retailer’s Optimal Private Standard 
Being the only intermediary agent between producers and consumers, the retailer is able 
to unilaterally impose a private standard.7 The retailer maximizes its profits by imposing 
a private standard, given the market equilibrium in Equation (11) that takes into account 
the retailer’s own optimal price-setting behavior and the consumers’ and producers’ 
optimal price-taking behavior. Formally, the retailer’s optimal private standard, Rs , is 
determined by the following first order condition, subject to R Gs s≥ :8 
 ( )( )* 0R xs xsx s u c− = . (22) 
Equation (22) shows that ( ) ( )* *R Rxs xsu x s c x s=  at Rs . Referring to the discussion 
following Equation (18), Equation (22) implies that the rent transfer from consumers to 
the retailer equals the rent transfer from the retailer to producers at Rs . This is intuitive: 
the retailer sets its private standard at the level where marginal revenues from increasing 
the private standard equal marginal expenditures. Additionally, abstracting from the 
trivial case where ( )* 0Rx s = , Equation (22) implies that xs xsu c=  at Rs , i.e. that the 
retailer sets its optimal private standard such that the shift in the inverse demand function 
is equal to the shift in the inverse supply function. From Equation (15), it also follows 
that * 0sx =  at Rs .  
                                                 
7 In the categorization of Henson and Humphrey (2008), such a private standard is labeled as a ‘de facto 
public standard’ although it is issued by a private organization, i.e. the retailer. These assumptions are 
consistent with private standards set by retail consortiums such as the BRC, GLOBAL.G.A.P., and GFSI. 
8 This condition reflects that the standard which effectively regulates the market is { }max ;G Rs s s= . Since 
the retailer moves second, he has no incentive to set a private standard that is lower than the public one, 
Gs , even if the retailer’s optimal private standard is lower than the public standard. Hence, either the 
retailer sets its private standard at a higher level than or equal to the government’s public standard (which is 
assumed to be given at this stage), or the retailer refrains from setting a private standard. 
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 Before turning to the government’s optimal public standard, we first discuss the 
marginal change in consumer surplus, producer profits, and social welfare at the retailer’s 
optimal private standard. This will already reveal some of the factors that play a role in 
the comparison between the levels of the public and private standard. At Rs , the 
standard’s marginal impact on consumer surplus is 
 ( ) ( )*
R
C
R
s xs
s s
s
u x s u
s =
∂Π = −∂ , (23) 
which equals the standard’s efficiency gain minus the rent transfer to the retailer, and 
may be positive or negative. Consumer surplus increases at the retailer’s optimal private 
standard if the efficiency gain is larger than the consumers’ rent transfer to the retailer. 
Similarly, the standard’s marginal impact on producer profits at Rs  is 
 ( ) ( )*
R
P
R
xs s
s s
s
x s c c
s =
∂Π = −∂ , (24) 
which equals the rent transfer from the retailer to the producers minus the implementation 
cost. The sign of Equation (24) is also undetermined: producers’ profits decrease at the 
retailer’s optimal private standard if the implementation cost is larger than the retailer’s 
rent transfer to producers; and vice versa.  
These marginal effects demonstrate that only under very specific circumstances – 
depending on the efficiency gain, implementation cost, and the different rent transfers – 
the interests of consumers and producers coincide with the retailer’s interest. This only 
happens when Equations (23) and (24) simultaneously equal zero at Rs . In any other 
case, the interests of the various market players differ. 
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From Equation (21) it follows that at Rs  the standard’s marginal impact on social 
welfare is 
 
( )
R
s s
s s
W s
u c
s =
∂ = −∂ , (25) 
which may be positive or negative depending on the relative size of the efficiency gain 
and the implementation cost. Hence, the retailer’s optimal private standard, Rs , equals 
the socially optimal standard, Ws , if and only if the efficiency gain equals the 
implementation cost ( )s su c=  at Rs . In any other case the optimal private standard is 
either higher (if s su c<  at Rs ) or lower (if s su c>  at Rs ) than the socially optimal 
standard. The cause for the potential welfare sub-optimality of the retailer’s optimal 
private standard is that the retailer does not incorporate the direct utility and cost effects 
into its profit maximizing behavior – the retailer only cares about maximizing the net rent 
transfer whereas the welfare calculus does take the net direct effects into account.  
Importantly, Equations (23) and (24) show that even if the private standard would 
be socially optimal ( s su c=  at Rs ), the private standard would involve rent transfers and 
consumers and producers could gain or lose.  
4.2. The Government’s Optimal Public Standard 
We now analyze the public standard-setting behavior of a government that is interested in 
both interest group contributions and social welfare. For this purpose we build on the 
political economy model of public standards as developed in Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele (2011). 
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Consider a government that maximizes its own objective function which, 
following the approach of Grossman and Helpman (1994), consists of a weighted sum of 
contributions from interest groups and social welfare. Similar to Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), we restrict the set of policies available to politicians and only allow them to 
implement a public standard s . We assume that producers and the retailer are politically 
organized into separate interest groups that lobby simultaneously and that consumers are 
not organized.9 
The ‘truthful’ contribution schedules of the producers and retailer are of the form 
( ) ( ){ }max 0, |k k k RC s s b s s= Π − ≥  with ,k P R= .10 kb  is a constant, a minimum level 
of profits the interest groups do not wish to spend on lobbying. The government’s 
objective function, ( )G sΠ , is a weighted sum of the interest group contributions, 
weighted by kα , and social welfare, where kα  represents the relative lobbying strength 
of the interest groups: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )G k k
k
s C s W sαΠ = +∑ . (26) 
                                                 
9 Our assumption that consumers do not lobby is not essential to our results. Consumer interests still play a 
role but through the social welfare function in the government’s objective function. 
10 The common-agency literature (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986) states that a truthful contribution 
schedule reflects the true preferences of the interest group. In our model this implies that lobby groups set 
their lobbying contributions in accordance with their expected profits and how these are marginally 
affected by the public standard. We refer to Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011) for a proof of the 
truthfulness of these contribution schedules. The contribution schedules are conditional on Rs s≥  to reflect 
that the standard which effectively regulates the market is { }max ;G Rs s s= . Contributions in favor of a 
public standard lower than the optimal private standard have no effect on the standard that regulates the 
market ( )Rs , and thus have no impact on the interest groups’ profits. Hence contributions in the interval 
Rs s<  would not be truthful and therefore the contribution schedule is restricted to Rs s≥ . However, 
because the government moves first in setting its public standard, this restriction of the contribution 
schedules does not imply that the government is not able to set a public standard in the interval Rs s< . 
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The government chooses the level of the public standard to maximize its objective 
function in (26). Each possible level of the public standard corresponds to a certain level 
of producer and retailer profits, and hence also to a certain level of producer and retailer 
contributions. This is driven by the functional form and the truthfulness of the 
contribution schedules which imply that the government receives higher contributions 
from the producers’ (retailer’s) interest group if the public standard creates higher 
producer (retailer) profits. Conversely, the government receives less producer or retailer 
contributions if the public standard decreases their respective profits. Therefore 
maximizing the contributions from the producers’ (retailer’s) interest group by choosing 
the level of the public standard is equivalent to maximizing their respective profits, i.e. 
( ) ( )k kC s s
s s
∂ ∂Π=∂ ∂  for 
Rs s≥ . The government thus chooses the level of the public 
standard to maximize the weighted sum of producer profits, retailer profits, and social 
welfare.11 The government’s optimal public standard, Gs , is therefore determined by the 
following first order condition, subject to G Rs s≥ : 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
* * *
*
0.
2
P G R G
xx s xs s xs xs
G
s s xs xs
x s c x c c x s u c
x s
u c u c
α α⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+ − + − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (27) 
First order condition (27) implicitly defines Gs  as a function of the lobbying strengths of 
the different interest groups ( )kα , the efficiency gain ( )su , the implementation cost 
                                                 
11 Because the retailer is a monopolist, strong interactions between the government and the monopolist may 
exist. In the extreme case that the retail sector is a ‘state monopoly’ and that the government is only 
concerned with the state monopoly’s profits (i.e. the monopolist retailer’s profits), the public standard 
would be set at the retailer’s optimal private standard and the government’s optimal public standard would 
coincide with the retailer’s optimal private standard. Our assumption that the monopolist has some positive 
political power Rα  – which could be large – is less extreme.  
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( )sc , the rent transfers ( )( * G xsx s u  and ( ) )* G xsx s c , and the marginal change in producer 
revenues ( )( )( )* *G xx s xsx s c x c+ , all evaluated at Gs . 
4.3. A Comparison of the Retailer’s Optimal Private Standard to the 
Government’s Optimal Public Standard 
We now compare the government’s optimal public standard, Gs , to the retailer’s optimal 
private standard, Rs , and analyze which factors determine their relative levels. Since 
production costs are sufficiently convex and consumer utility sufficiently concave in s  to 
ensure that both GΠ  and RΠ  are concave in s , it suffices to determine the sign of the 
standard’s marginal impact on the government’s objective function at Rs , ( )
R
G
s s
s
s =
∂Π
∂ . 
Because of concavity, if ( ) 0
R
G
s s
s
s =
∂Π >∂  then 
R Gs s< , and vice versa. Inserting into 
Equation (27) the results of Equation (22) that xs xsu c=  and * 0sx =  at Rs , the expression 
for the standard’s marginal impact on the government’s objective function at Rs  is 
 ( )
( )
( )
( )
*
1 2
R
G
P R
s s xs s
s s
s
u c x s c c
s
α
=
⎡ ⎤∂Π ⎢ ⎥= − + −⎢ ⎥∂ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
??? ?????? , (28) 
which may be positive or negative. Part (1) of Equation (28) equals the marginal social 
welfare effect of the standard at Rs  (see Equation (25)), and may be positive or negative 
depending on whether the efficiency gain, su , is respectively larger or smaller than the 
implementation cost, sc . Part (2) represents the standard’s marginal impact on producer 
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profits at Rs  (see Equation (24)). It consists of the rent transfer from the retailer to 
producers, ( )* R xsx s c , minus the standard’s implementation cost, sc , and is weighted by 
the political power of the producers’ interest group, Pα . Part (2) may be positive or 
negative as well. Hence, a priori, it is not determined which of the two standards is more 
stringent. The retailer’s optimal private standard may thus be higher or lower than the 
government’s optimal public standard. We are particularly interested in the case where 
Equation (28) is negative, i.e. when the retailer’s optimal private standard is more 
stringent than government’s optimal public standard ( )R Gs s> , and which factors affect 
this.12 
The key factors that lead to private standards being more stringent than public 
standards, i.e. R Gs s> , are summarized by Equation (28). First, the rent transfer from the 
retailer to producers, ( )* R xsx s c , plays an important role. If either xsc  or ( )* Rx s  is 
smaller, the standard’s marginal impact on producer profits at Rs  (part (2) of Equation 
(28)) is more negative or less positive such that Equation (28) is more likely to be 
negative, and R Gs s> . The upward shift in the inverse supply function, xsc , measures 
how much the retailer additionally compensates the producers for an increase in the 
standard and a given level of the equilibrium output. A lower xsc  thus means that the rent 
transfer from the retailer to producers is lower, ceteris paribus, and that producers bear a 
                                                 
12 Naturally, these same factors – in opposite direction – lead to the reverse situation where the retailer’s 
optimal private standard is less stringent, i.e. R Gs s< . However, this situation is not relevant since a 
private standard is redundant if less stringent than the public standard. Because the retailer moves second in 
setting its private standard, the retailer has no incentive to set a private standard that is lower than the 
public one. Hence, either the retailer sets its private standard at a higher level than the government’s 
optimal public standard, or the retailer refrains from setting a private standard. As a consequence, it are the 
same factors as the ones we discuss (but in opposite direction) that explain the absence of private standards 
in specific markets. 
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larger share of the implementation cost. The rent transfer is also smaller relative to the 
implementation cost when the market is smaller ( ( )* Rx s  lower). Hence, if either xsc  or 
( )* Rx s  is smaller such that the retailer’s rent transfer to producers is smaller, the 
producers’ interest group lobbies in favor of a lower public standard and Equation (28) is 
more likely to be negative, i.e. R Gs s> . 
Second, when producer profits are marginally decreasing in the standard at Rs , 
i.e. when part (2) in Equation (28) is negative, a larger political power of the producers’ 
interest group, Pα , increases the likelihood that Equation (28) is negative and R Gs s> . 
When the producers’ preferred level of the standard is lower than the retailer’s optimal 
private standard, producers lobby in favor of a public standard that is lower than the 
retailer’s optimal private standard. With a larger political power producers lobby more 
successfully, ceteris paribus, so that they are able to reduce the level of the government’s 
optimal public standard. 
Third, the size of the efficiency gain matters. If su  is smaller, the marginal social 
welfare effect at Rs  (part (1) of Equation (28)) is less positive or more negative. Hence, 
with a lower efficiency gain, Equation (28) is more likely to be negative such that 
R Gs s> , ceteris paribus. A lower efficiency gain induces the government to set a lower 
public standard because of social welfare considerations, while the retailer does not take 
social welfare effects into account.  
Fourth, the size of the implementation cost, sc , affects both social welfare and 
producer profits. Equation (28) is more likely to be negative with a higher 
implementation cost, such that R Gs s> . The intuition behind this result is that a higher 
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implementation cost causes the government to set a lower public standard, not only 
because of social welfare considerations but also because the producers’ interest group 
lobbies in favor of a lower public standard. In contrast, the retailer is not concerned with 
social welfare effects, so that the retailer’s optimal private standard is not affected by a 
change in the implementation cost. Due to producer lobbying, a change in the 
implementation cost has a larger impact on Equation (28) than a similar change in the 
efficiency gain (but in opposite direction), ceteris paribus. 
To summarize, the retailer’s optimal private standard is more likely to be higher 
than the government’s optimal public one for markets and standards where (a) the 
retailer’s rent transfer to compensate producers for the standards’ implementation cost is 
smaller ( ( )* R xsx s c  small); (b) the producers’ interest group has a relatively large political 
power ( Pα  high) given that producers prefer lower standards than the retailer 
( ( )* Rs xsc x s c>  at Rs ); (c) standards generate a small efficiency gain ( su  small); and (d) 
standards entail a large implementation cost ( sc  high). Under these conditions, it is more 
likely that the retailer sets its optimal private standard at a higher level than the 
government’s optimal public standard. Hence these factors may explain the observation 
that in some sectors, private standards are more stringent than public ones. 
4.4. Retailers’ Market Power 
In this section, we analyze to what extent retailers’ market power is important to our 
results. So far, for the sake of reducing complexity, we have modeled retailers’ market 
power by assuming that only one firm is active in the retail sector. To analyze how the 
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results change when retailers have no market power we now consider a retail sector that 
is characterized by perfect competition.  
The assumption of perfect competition among retailers has consequences for both 
the government’s and retailers’ optimal standard-setting behavior. First, in a perfectly 
competitive retail sector, each retailer i  is identical and faces the same consumer and 
producer prices, respectively ( ),p x s  and ( ),w x s , where x  is the sum of all quantities 
transferred by retailers, i.e. i
i
x x=∑ . An individual retailer i ’s profits are thus equal to 
( ) ( ) ( ), ,Ri is p x s w x s xΠ = −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . However, a retailer’s average revenues ( )*,p x s  must 
equal average costs ( )*,w x s  in a stable and perfectly competitive market equilibrium, 
because of free entry and exit. As a consequence, retailers’ profits are zero at market 
equilibrium for any potential level of the standard s . It then follows from the truthful 
contributions schedules specified above that under perfect competition the retailers’ 
interest group never offers strictly positive contributions to the government. Therefore 
perfectly competitive retailers have no influence on the government’s public standard-
setting and the government’s first order condition which determines Gs  reduces to: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )* * * *1 0P G Gxs xx s s s xs xx sx s c c x c u x s u u xα ⎡ ⎤+ + − + − + =⎣ ⎦ . (29) 
 Second, retailers face additional constraints when setting private standards in a 
perfectly competitive retail sector. Retailers can only set individual private standards, i.e. 
there is no collusion in private standard-setting possible because this would be 
inconsistent with the perfect competition assumption that retailers have no market power. 
Moreover, perfect retail competition prevents a retailer from introducing an individual 
private standard with which producers are not willing to comply, i.e. a standard that 
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reduces producers’ profits, because then producers would only sell to other retailers that 
set a lower or no individual private standard. In other words, a retailer can only set an 
individual private standard, Ris , that has a positive marginal impact on producers’ profits. 
Formally, the producers’ incentive compatibility constraint is 
 ( )( )* * 0
R
i
P
R
i xs xx s s
s s
x s c c x c
s =
∂Π = + − ≥∂ . (30) 
The same reasoning can be applied to consumers. Consumers are only willing to buy 
from a retailer that imposes an individual private standard if that private standard has a 
positive marginal impact on consumer surplus – otherwise consumers would only make 
purchases with other retailers who impose a lower or no individual private standard. The 
consumers’ compatibility constraint is thus 
 ( )( )* * 0
R
i
C
R
s i xs xx s
s s
u x s u u x
s =
∂Π = − + ≥∂ . (31) 
Inserting the producers’ and consumers’ incentive compatibility constraints 
(respectively Equations (30) and (31)) into the government’s first order condition (29) 
implies that 0
R
i
G
s ss =
∂Π ≥∂ . Because of concavity, it unambiguously follows that 
G R
is s≥ . This result implies that perfectly competitive retailers have no incentives to 
impose individual private standards that are higher than the government’s optimal public 
standard, and that retailers will therefore refrain from imposing private standards.13 
                                                 
13 This result would be different in an oligopolistic retail sector where several retailers have some market 
power. This situation has been extensively analyzed in the literature on vertical differentiation and 
minimum quality standards, for example by Spence (1976), Ronnen (1991), and Valletti (1995), and their 
results would carry over to our analysis. In an oligopolistic retail sector, retailers would be able to set 
different individual private standards – with some higher than the public standard – as strategic tools to 
create market segmentation and softening competition. 
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This analysis shows that retailers’ market power is a necessary condition for 
retailers’ optimal private standards to be more stringent than the government’s optimal 
public standard. Market power allows retailers to unilaterally impose private standards 
that violate producers’ and/or consumers’ incentive compatibility constraints, and that are 
potentially higher than the government’s optimal public standard. We continue the 
remainder of this paper under the assumption of a monopolist retailer, i.e. that retailers 
have market power. 
5 Application: Developing Countries’ High Value Crop Exports 
We use the example of developing countries’ high value crop exports to developed 
countries to illustrate how the model’s results and implications may carry over to real-
world situations. Private standards are increasingly important in these export sectors. For 
example, Maertens and Swinnen (2009) document that the fresh and processed fruits and 
vegetables (FFV) sector is one of the most dynamic export sectors in developing 
countries and that FFV exports are increasingly confronted with tightening food 
standards set by large retailing companies. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) also argue that 
these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts.  
 In such high value crop export sectors as the FFV sector, consumers and the 
multinational retailer are typically located in the importing, developed country, and 
producers in the exporting, developing country. This has implications for the 
governments’ objective functions in both countries. In the developed country, the 
government maximizes the sum of contributions from the retailer’s interest group and 
social welfare, which comprises consumer surplus and the retailer’s profits. In the 
developing country, the government maximizes the sum of contributions from the 
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producers’ interest group and social welfare, which only consists of producer profits.14 
The standard’s marginal impact on the governments’ objective functions at Rs , for 
respectively the developed ( )DC  and less-developed ( )LDC  country, is 
 ( ) ( )*
R
G
DC R
s xs
s s
s
u x s u
s =
∂Π = −∂ ; (32) 
and 
 ( ) ( ) ( )*1
R
G
LDC P R
xs s
s s
s
x s c c
s
α
=
∂Π ⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦∂ . (33) 
If both Equations (32) and (33) are negative, the retailer’s private standard is more 
stringent than both the developed and developing countries’ public standards. From 
Equation (22) it follows that at the retailer’s optimum ( ) ( )* *R Rxs xsx s c x s u= . Hence a 
necessary and sufficient condition for both Equations (32) and (33) to be simultaneously 
negative is that 
 ( )* Rs xs su x s c c< < . (34) 
Equation (34) demonstrates that the retailer’s optimal private standard will be more 
stringent than the governments’ optimal public standards in both the developed and 
developing countries if the efficiency gain (for the developed country’s consumers) is 
smaller than the consumers’ rent transfer to the retailer, and the implementation cost (for 
the developing country’s producers) is larger than the retailer’s rent transfer to producers. 
 Typically the implementation cost is relatively large in developing countries ( sc  
high), due to low human capital, imperfect capital markets, underdeveloped institutions, 
                                                 
14 We thus assume that an interest group can only contribute to its own government, and that a government 
is only concerned with domestic welfare. 
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etc. Additionally, process standards such as for example traceability standards imposed 
by the GLOBALG.A.P. have a relatively low direct impact on consumers, i.e. su  is low. 
If both factors are such that Equation (34) holds, the private standard set by the retailer 
will be more stringent than the public standards set by the developed and developing 
countries’ governments. In combination, these factors may contribute to explaining why 
retailers’ private standards are more stringent than public standards on developing 
countries’ high value crop exports. 
6 Extension: Side Payments 
So far we have assumed that producers cannot directly influence the retailer’s private 
standard-setting behavior. However, if producers are able to form into an interest group 
that influences the government’s public standard-setting process, it is possible that they 
are also able to directly influence the retailer’s private standard-setting behavior. In 
general, as Equation (24) shows, the producers’ interests do not coincide with the 
retailer’s interests. Therefore, producers may make side payments to convince the retailer 
of setting a private standard that is more aligned with the producers’ interests.15 This 
section analyzes how side payments from producers to the retailer may affect the results 
of our model, i.e. how the level of the retailer’s optimal private standard compares to the 
level of the government’s optimal public standard when side payments are possible. 
To analyze the impact of these side payments, we need to make some additional 
assumptions. We assume that, after the public standard has been set by the government, 
the producers’ interest group offers the retailer a truthful side payment schedule that 
                                                 
15 This is of course conditional on the retailer’s optimal private standard being more stringent than the 
public one. 
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specifies how much producers are willing to pay the retailer for each potential level of the 
private standard. The producers’ truthful side payment schedule is of the form 
( ) ( ) { }( ){ }max 0, max , |P P G R GS s s s s s s= Π −Π ≥ . The schedule implies that producers 
are willing to make side payments equal to at most the difference between their profits 
under a private standard s  and their profits under the standard that regulates the market 
in the absence of side payments, i.e. { }max ,G Rs s , where Rs  and Gs  are defined by 
respectively Equations (22) and (27). The side payments are restricted to the interval 
Gs s≥  because, given that the market is regulated by the most stringent standard, side 
payments for a private standard that is lower than the public standard ( )Gs s<  would 
have no impact on producers’ profits, and would not be truthful. 
Taking into account the producers’ potential side payments, the retailer now 
maximizes ( ) ( )R s S sΠ +  when setting its private standard. The retailer’s optimal private 
standard with side payments, RPs , is then determined by the following first order 
condition, subject to RP Gs s≥ :16 
 ( )( )* * 0RP xs xx s sx s u c x c+ − = . (35) 
Equation (35) is equivalent to setting the sum of the standard’s marginal impact on the 
retailer’s and producers’ profits (respectively Equations (17) and (18)) equal to zero at 
RPs . Hence, when setting a private standard with potential side payments, the retailer also 
takes the standard’s marginal impact on producer profits into account. By making side 
payments to the retailer, producers obtain that the retailer internalizes the effect of a 
                                                 
16 The standard that effectively regulates the market is now { }max ;G RPs s s= , and again the retailer has no 
incentive to set a private standard that is lower than the public one. 
 - 34 - 
private standard on producer profits in its private standard-setting behavior. This implies 
that, when producer profits are marginally decreasing (increasing) in the standard at Rs , 
the optimal private standard with side payments RPs  is lower (higher) than Rs , given that 
RPs  is larger than Gs . In other words, the side payments induce the retailer to set a 
private standard that is more aligned with producers’ interests. 
 As a consequence, these side payments may also have an impact on how the 
levels of the government’s optimal public standard and the retailer’s private standard 
compare to one another. Before we compare these levels, we first determine the 
government’s optimal public standard, Gs , in the presence of side payments. To account 
for the potential side payments, the truthful contribution schedules of the producers and 
the retailer are adjusted to respectively ( ) ( ) ( ){ }max 0, |P P RP P RPC s s S s b s s= Π − − ≥  
and ( ) ( ) ( ){ }max 0, |R R RP R RPC s s S s b s s= Π + − ≥ . The government’s optimal public 
standard, Gs , is then determined by the following first order condition, subject to 
G RPs s≥ : 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
* * *
*
0.
2
P G R G
xx s xs s xs xs
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α α⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+ − + − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (36) 
Because the interest group’s contribution schedules are truthful, i.e. because the interest 
groups set their lobbying contributions in accordance with how their expected profits are 
marginally affected by the public standard, the side payments have no impact on the 
government’s optimal public standard and the first order condition in (36) is the same as 
without side payments in (27). 
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As in Section 4.3, to determine whether the retailer’s optimal private standard 
with side payments is stricter than the government’s optimal public standard, we need to 
determine the sign of the standard’s marginal impact on the government’s objective 
function at RPs , i.e. ( )
RP
G
s s
s
s =
∂Π
∂ . If 
( ) 0
RP
G
s s
s
s =
∂Π <∂  then 
RP Gs s> , and vice versa. 
Using Conditions (35) and (36), the expression for the standard’s marginal impact on the 
government’s objective function at RPs  is 
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 (37) 
which may be positive or negative. Part (1) of Equation (37) is the standard’s marginal 
impact on social welfare at RPs , and can be positive or negative (see Equation (21)). Part 
(2) of Equation (37) represents the standard’s marginal impact on producer profits at RPs  
which may also be positive or negative (see Equation (17)). The retailer’s optimal private 
standard with side payments, RPs , may thus be higher or lower than the government’s 
optimal public standard, Gs . 
 To examine whether the retailer’s optimal private standard compares differently 
to the government’s optimal public standard with and without side payments, we need to 
compare Equations (28) and (37). If Equation (37) is more negative than Equation (28), 
then, because of concavity, the retailer’s optimal private standard with side payments will 
be further away from the government’s optimal public standard than the retailer’s optimal 
private standard without side payments, i.e. G R RPs s s< < ; and vice versa. Comparing 
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these equations is not straightforward since they are evaluated at different levels of the 
standard. However, in general Equation (37) will be less negative than Equation (28) (or 
even positive) if producer profits are marginally decreasing at Rs ; and vice versa. To 
understand why this is the case, take the example where producer profits are marginally 
decreasing at Rs , and assume for simplicity that s su c=  for any value of s . Then 
Equation (28) is negative and R Gs s> . If producer profits are marginally decreasing at 
Rs , it also follows that RP Rs s<  because of the producers’ side payments to the retailer. 
Since RPs  is necessarily closer to the producers’ preferred level of the standard than Rs , it 
follows from the concavity of the producers’ profit function that the marginal decrease in 
producer profits is less negative at RPs  than at Rs . Hence part (2) of Equation (37) is less 
negative than part (2) of Equation (28). Moreover, the weight attached to part (2) is lower 
in Equation (37) than in Equation (28), i.e. P R Pα α α− < , which reinforces the previous 
effect. Additionally, because RP Rs s< , it follows from the concavity of the retailer’s 
profit function that the standard’s marginal impact on retailer profits is positive at RPs , 
and thus that part (1) of Equation (37) is positive. Together these factors render Equation 
(37) less negative than Equation (28), such that, because of concavity, RPs  is closer to Gs  
than Rs  to Gs . In the extreme, if these effects render Equation (37) positive, RPs  would 
be lower than Gs  and thus the private standard would not be imposed if side payments 
are allowed. In contrast, if no side payments are possible, the private standard is set at a 
higher level than the public standard ( )R Gs s> . 
The intuition behind the previous result is that if producer profits are marginally 
decreasing at the retailer’s optimal private standard without side payments, and if this 
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private standard is more stringent than the public standard ( )R Gs s> , producers have an 
incentive to make side payments to the retailer to lower its private standard. These side 
payments reduce the level of the private standard set by the retailer ( )RP Rs s<  and the 
private standard is set closer to the government’s optimal public standard. If these side 
payments are sufficiently large, they may even withhold the retailer from setting a private 
standard. In that case, the standard that governs the market is the public standard, Gs , and 
retailers receive side payments equal to ( ) ( )P G P Rs sΠ −Π . If side payments would not 
be allowed, the standard that governs the market would be Rs  since R Gs s> . 
 Vice versa, if producer profits are marginally increasing at the retailer’s optimal 
private standard without side payments, producers have an incentive to make side 
payments such that the retailer sets a higher private standard ( )RP Rs s> . If R Gs s> , then 
Equation (37) is more negative than Equation (28) and the private standard with side 
payments is further away from the public standard ( )G R RPs s s< < . Moreover, if R Gs s<  
(Equation (28) positive), i.e. the retailer does not impose a private standard without side 
payments, producers’ side payments may induce the retailer to set a private standard at a 
higher level than the public one (Equation (37) negative), i.e. R G RPs s s< <  
In summary, side payments may affect the comparison between the government’s 
optimal public standard and the retailer’s optimal private standard in either way, 
depending on how producers’ interests are affected by the standard at the retailer’s 
optimal private standard without side payments. 
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7 Conclusions 
It is well documented that retailers’ private standards are increasingly important in the 
global economy. Empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently 
more stringent than their public counterparts. Several explanations have been offered to 
explain this stylized fact, and this paper adds an additional potential explanation by 
taking a political-economic perspective. 
 In the model, we assume three market players, namely consumers, producers, and 
a monopolist retailer. The retailer is a necessary intermediary agent that transfers goods 
from producers to consumers. A standard is assumed to positively affect consumer utility, 
while it also entails implementation costs. Private and public standards are assumed to 
have the same effect on consumer utility, and on production costs, ceteris paribus. We 
assume that the government sets a public standard to maximize, in line with Grossman 
and Helpman (1994), an objective function that is the weighted sum of interest group 
contributions and social welfare. Additionally, the retailer may set a private standard that 
regulates the same characteristics as the government’s public standard. 
 Under these assumptions, we first show that all three market players may gain or 
lose from (a change in) a standard, and that this change involves rent transfer between the 
different market players. Likewise, social welfare may either increase or decrease with a 
change in the standard, depending on the relative size of the efficiency gain, 
implementation cost, and different rent transfers.  
 Second, we show that only under very specific circumstances the retailer’s 
optimal private standard is also optimal from both the consumers’ and producers’ 
perspective. In any other case, the market players’ interests differ. 
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 Third, our analysis demonstrates that the retailer’s optimal private standard only 
maximizes social welfare if the standard’s direct welfare effects on consumers and 
producers cancel out. The reason is that the retailer only cares about the standard’s net 
rent transfer effects, not about the direct welfare effects which the welfare calculus does 
take into account. However, even if the socially optimal standard and the private one are 
equal, this does not imply that this level of the standard is optimal for consumers and/or 
producers, since even the standard that maximizes social welfare involves rent transfers. 
 Fourth, by comparing the retailer’s optimal private standard to the government’s 
optimal public standard, we show that several factors may cause the private standard to 
be more stringent than the public one. We demonstrate that a retailer is more likely to set 
a more stringent private standard if (a) the rent transfer from the retailer to producers is 
smaller such that producers bear a larger share of the standard’s implementation cost; (b) 
the producers’ interest group has a larger political power when producers’ interests are 
opposite to those of the retailer; (c) the standard creates a smaller efficiency gain for 
consumers; and (d) the standard entails larger implementation costs for producers. We 
also show that retailers’ market power is crucial in this argument: if retailers have no 
market power, private standards are never set at higher levels than public standards. 
Hence when producers use their political power to obtain lower public standards, retailers 
may apply their market power to set higher private standards. In combination these 
factors may contribute to explaining why industry-wide private standards may be more 
stringent than their public counterparts.  
Fifth, we illustrate our model with an application to developing countries’ high-
value crop exports to developed countries and show how our model may contribute to 
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explaining why in these sectors private standards are more stringent than public 
standards, both imposed by the developing (exporting) and the developed (importing) 
country. 
Sixth, we extend our model to allow producers to influence the retailer’s private 
standard-setting behavior by making side payments, which may induce the retailer to set 
a private standard that is more aligned with producers’ interest. Depending on how the 
producers’ interests are affected by the standard at the retailer’s optimal private standard 
without side payments, these side payments may affect the comparison between the 
government’s optimal public standard and the private standard in either way. 
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Figure 1. Retailers’ self-assessed standards compared to those of government 
(Source: Fulponi 2007) 
 
